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Abstract
This paper re-examines the spaceship problem, i.e. the design of the
optimal population under a xed living space, by focusing on the dilemma
between adding new beings and extending the life of existing beings. For
that purpose, we characterize, under time-additive individual welfare de-
pending negatively on population density, the preference ordering of a
utilitarian social planner over lifetime-equal histories, i.e. histories with
demographic conditions yielding an equal nite number of life-periods (im-
posed by resources constraints). The analysis of the spaceship problem
contradicts widespread beliefs about the populationism of Classical Util-
itarianism and the antipopulationism of Average Utilitarianism. We also
study the invariance property exhibited by various utilitarian rankings to
the total space available and to individual preferences. Finally, we com-
pare histories for a spaceship with a stationary population, and try to
accomodate intuitions about posterity and renewal of populations.
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1 Introduction
Given that the Earth is of nite size - and, thus, can be compared, following
Boulding (1966), to a spaceship- the question of the optimal population size
can be formulated as the spaceship problem: are there too few or, on the
contrary, too many beings living on our bounded, resources-nite, spaceship?
That question, which is today at the centre of sustainable development debates,
is actually an old issue, to which various answers were given over time.
While Mercantilism was, during the 16th and 17th centuries, promoting a
population as large as possible by means of various policies, it should not be
deduced from this that the spaceship constraint was ignored by Mercantilist
thought.1 Actually, it is quite the opposite: a standard Mercantilist argument
was that the niteness of the living space, if coupled with a large population,
would favour migrations, and, hence, the colonization of other territories.
The Italian philosopher Giovanni Botero (1588) is generally regarded as one
of the rst thinkers who argued against the Mercantilist populationism, and
asked the question of the optimal population size. Botero argued that men
have a tendency to multiply themselves as much as nature allows. However,
natural resources are limited, so that, according to Botero, one cannot escape
the following adjustments: either people will modify their behaviours, or there
will be some adjustment in numbers through famines, diseases or wars.
Within economic thought, Richard Cantillon (1755) provided another early
study of the spaceship problem, by highlighting the existence of a quantity
of life versus quality of life trade-o¤, which restrains feasible population sizes.
According to Cantillon, Mans subsistence requires living space, whose amount
depends on lifestyles, so that an arbitrage is to be made between the quantity
and quality of life.2 While Cantillon did not solve that trade-o¤, he showed
that, contrary to Mercantilistsbeliefs, more people is not always better.3
Another contribution to the spaceship problem was made by Thomas Malthus
(1798), who argued that the population size is necessarily limited within some
boundaries. A population would follow a geometric progression if left unchecked
(i.e. in the absence of resources constraints), but the production of means of
subsistence follows, at best, an arithmetical progression (because of the nite-
ness of land), so that the population must, at some point, be checked, either
by a positive check (deaths) or by a preventive check (fewer children).4
Given that Botero, Cantillon and Malthuss positive theories, by underlining
the constraints imposed by the niteness of land, only restrict the set of feasible
populations, these leave open the normative question of the optimal population.
That issue was widely studied within utilitarianism. While Jeremy Ben-
thams (1789) Classical Utilitarianism recommends a number of people produc-
ing the greatest happiness of the greatest number, one may also, following
1On Mercantilism and population, see Schumpeter (1954, 1, pp. 352-356).
2See Cantillons comparison of peasants living modestly in the South of France with grown-
up bourgeois living in abundance (1755, p. 25).
3See Cantillon (1755, I, 15, p. 30):
It is also a question outside of my subject whether it is better to have a great
multitude of inhabitants, poor and badly provided, than a small number, much
more at their ease: a million who consume the produce of 6 acres per head or 4
million who live on the product of an acre and a half.
4 In later writings, Malthus (1830) will add a third type of check: the moral restraint.
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Sidgwicks (1874) insights, consider the maximization not of total welfare, but
of average welfare, which di¤ers from Benthamite utilitarianism in di¤erent
numbers choices. However, as shown by Part (1984), those two criteria of
population ethics are unsatisfactory. Classical Utilitarianism su¤ers from the
Repugnant Conclusion, whereas Average Utilitarianism faces the Mere Addi-
tion Paradox.5 Hence, other population ethics criteria were developed, such
as Critical-Level Utilitarianism (Blackorby and Donaldson 1984) and Number-
Dampened Utilitarianism (Ng 1986). But although (partly) immunized against
Parts criticisms, these su¤er from other weaknesses. Imposing a low critical
level still implies the Repugnant Conclusion, while a high critical level leads to
what Arrhenius and Bykvist (1995) call the Sadistic Conclusion.6 Moreover,
Number-Dampened Utilitarianism might lack intuitive support.
Although much has been written on the optimal population of the Earth
spaceship, the specicity of this paper with respect to the existing literature is
precisely to consider the spaceship problem on the basis of new fundamentals.
Actually, instead of studying the optimal population size without specifying
the structure of the population, we propose to re-examine that issue under a
more precise specication of the populations at stake. For that purpose, we
will distinguish here between the two ends of the demographic chain: births
and deaths. The intuition is the following. As stressed by Broome (2004), the
issue of the optimal number of people is not independent from the issue of the
optimal longevity. True, making a person exist and making an existing person
live more are, from a moral point of view, two distinct things, but these tend
both to inuence the number of people at a given point in time, so that the two
ends of the demographic chain are relevant for the spaceship problem.
Therefore, we propose a re-examination, from a utilitarian perspective, of
the spaceship problem, in which both reproduction and survival are explicitly
modelized. The question raised is the following. Suppose that a population,
which cares about living a long life in a large living space, has to share a space
of nite size. How does the optimal population look in terms of fertility rate and
longevity? To answer that question, we will make some signicant simplica-
tions, so that the present study should only be regarded as a rst step towards
a characterization of the solution of the spaceship problem.
First, in order to formalize the longevity versus fertility trade-o¤s, we will
characterize the preferences of a social planner over lifetime-equal histories,
dened by demographic conditions (i.e. initial population, fertility and survival
rates) yielding an equal nite number of life-periods.7 The intuition behind
assuming a nite length of history is that some constraints, such as a given
stock of non-renewable resources, may tend to limit the total number of periods
that can be collectively lived on the spaceship. However, in the last part of
the paper we relax that assumption and focus on a spaceship with a stationary
5The Repugnant Conclusion is dened as follows: for any large population, there is a much
larger population with a much lower welfare per head, but which is regarded as better. The
Mere Addition Paradox consists of regarding as undesirable the addition of people with a
welfare slightly lower than the initial average welfare, even if the welfare of the initial popula-
tion is una¤ected. Average Utilitarianism violates the Mere Addition Principle, according to
which adding persons with a positive welfare should not make things worse ceteris paribus.
6The Sadistic Conclusion consists of preferring a small population with an extremely low
utility to a very large population just below the critical level (see Bykvist 2007).
7Reasoning under a xed total number of life-periods is an analytically convenient way to
account for longevity versus fertility trade-o¤s, to be rened further in future works.
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population. That latter case coincides with an innite history.
Moreover, this paper will not consider here the question of the optimal di-
versity of the population to be put on the spaceship, contrary to the literature
dedicated to the Noahs Ark Problem (see Weitzman 1998). On the contrary,
we will, in this paper, focus on the characterization of the population that yields
the maximum welfare under a uniform composition of that population.
Furthermore, in our model, the numberss pressure comes only from popula-
tion density, which reduces welfare through a pure congestion e¤ect (see Cramer
et al 2004). Thus, we will not study here the production of goods, which, since
Malthuss work, has occupied a central place in the spaceship problem. Given
the observed growth of production per head despite the large population growth,
production limitations due to the niteness of land do not seem likely.8
Finally, given the intuitive weaknesses faced by various criteria of population
ethics (see Blackorby et al 2005), it makes sense to re-examine the spaceship
problem on the basis of several ethical criteria. However, due to space con-
straints, we shall here focus only on some widely used normative criteria, such
as Classical, Average, Critical-Level and Number-Dampened Utilitarianisms,
and leave other criteria aside, which is also a signicant simplication.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework.
Section 3 studies a simplied spaceship problem, in which the population cannot
reproduce itself, and characterizes the ordering of lifetime-equal histories under
various utilitarian criteria. Section 4 explores the more general problem where
the population can reproduce itself. Section 5 considers a stationary spaceship
(i.e. with a constant asymptotic population). Section 6 concludes.
2 The spaceship problem: general setting
The spaceship problem consists of the choice of a population to be put on a
spaceship, that is, a place with a nite surface for life. By the terms choos-
ing a population, we mean the choice of not only an initial group of people
(i.e. the pioneers) to be put on the spaceship, but, also, the choice of survival
conditions for them, as individual longevity is, given the niteness of the space-
ship, a¤ected by the size of the group of pioneers. Congestion is not neutral
for longevity, because overpopulation can prevent the access to vital resources
(through depletion, pollution or other phenomena). Thus, depending on the
more or less large initial size of the group of pioneers, each pioneer will have,
given the niteness of the spaceship, a more or less short life.
Examples of spaceship problems are numerous. One can consider the selec-
tion of an optimal number of astronauts to be sent into space on a rocket. In
that case, there will be, in general, no opportunity for astronauts to reproduce
themselves in the spaceship, so that survival conditions depend exclusively on
the size of the initial group. Another example of a spaceship problem consists of
the selection of a population to live on a planet. In that case, survival conditions
depend on the size of the initial group, but there is a di¤erence with respect
8Actually, as Heilig (1994) argues in the light of (mistaken) past studies on the maximum
carrying capacity of the Earth in terms of population, the niteness of space does not seem
to be a problem for production, so that we can abstract from that constraint. One may go
further, and argue, following Kremer (1994), that population pressure is good for production,
as technological progress is proportional to the population size.
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to the rocket case: the general living conditions on the planet may allow the
reproduction of persons, so that survival conditions depend also on the fertility
behaviour, which may cause shorter lives through environmental congestion.
2.1 Assumptions
Before examining those various kinds of spaceship problems in more detail, let
us rst formally introduce the general spaceship problem and the assumptions
that we will make throughout this paper.
 Assumption A1 A place of nite surface Q is available for the life of a
population.
 Assumption A2 Only living persons occupy a part of the space Q.
Moreover, all living persons at a particular point in time t = 0; 1; 2; :::;1,
whatever their age is, are assumed to occupy an equal amount of space, dened
as the total space divided by the number of people alive at that time.9
 Assumption A3 Each person alive at time t enjoys an equal share of the
total available space: qt =
Q
Lt
, where Lt denotes the population size at
time t, whereas qt denotes the space available per person.
Here are the assumptions we make on individual welfare.
 Assumption A4 At each period, the temporal welfare of a person who
is dead equals 0:
ut = 0 8t  T
where T denotes the date of death of the person.
 Assumption A5 At each period, the temporal welfare of a person who is
alive depends on the space available per person, according to the function:
ut = u(qt) = (qt)

+  8t < T
where 0 <  < 1 and  is the intercept of the temporal utility function.
Assumption A4 is a standard normalization.10 Assumption A5 is a simple
way to capture the disutility from environmental congestion due to overpopula-
tion. According to A5, adding one person to a spaceship of nite size necessarily
decreases the welfare of every individual on the spaceship.11 Note that, if   0,
being alive is always better than being dead, whatever the level of qt is. On
the contrary, if  < 0, there exists a level of qt that makes a person indi¤erent
between, on the one hand, one life-period with that space, and, on the other
hand, being dead during that period.
9Thus we will abstract here from problems of intragenerational distribution of space.
10A4 allows us also to avoid di¢ culties associated with the possibility of innite utility,
which would occur under a non-zero utility of death, as dead persons remain dead innitely.
11 In reality, it is only below some threshold for qt that adding one person reduces the welfare
of every inhabitant. Thus A5 is a strong simplication made for analytical convenience.
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 Assumption A6 The lifetime welfare w of a person is the sum of the
utilities associated to each life-period:
w =
TX
t=0
u (qt)
Assumption A6 is, although largely questioned by Bommier (2006), still a
standard one, due to its simplicity. Let us now turn to the characterization of
the demography.
 Assumption A7 The initial population of the spaceship, denoted by L,
is nite and strictly positive (L > 0).
 Assumption A8 At each passage of time, a fraction S of the population
alive at a period survives to the next period (0 < S < 1).
Assumption A8 amounts to assuming that the strength of mortality is con-
stant over the lifecycle: at each passage of time, a constant fraction of a cohort
disappears from the spaceship. Assumption A8 is made to restrict the longevity
dimension to a single parameter, S.
 Assumption A9 A person surviving to the second period of life will give
birth to n children at the beginning of that second period (n  0).
Assumption A9 amounts to supposing that the intensity of desires (in
Malthuss words) or the need for a dynasty is constant across people and times.12
This allows us to conne fertility concerns to a single parameter, n.13
2.2 Problem setting
In order to study how a social planner solves the spaceship problem, dened as
the choice of an initial number of persons L, a proportion of survivors S, and
a fertility rate n under the space constraint, we assume that the social planner
has to choose among a set of histories, dened as follows.
 Denition D1 A history is a triplet fL; S; ng, where L is the size of the
population at time 0 (L > 0), S is the proportion of survivors from a
period t to a period t+ 1 (0 < S < 1), and n is the fertility rate.
In order to describe the planners solution, we shall concentrate on a partic-
ular subset of the set of histories: lifetime-equal histories, dened as follows.14
12A9 amounts to assuming that all births are located, for a given person, during, and only
during, the second period of his life, and, more exactly, at the beginning of that second period.
For instance, the S2L members of cohort 0 who are alive in their third period of life do not
give birth to any o¤spring in period 2 and beyond, but only at the beginning of period 1, and
the utility of their children is counted for the whole period during which they are born.
13Note that this model does not distinguish between males and females, so that n, the
fertility rate per person, concerns all people, and not only women as in real life. A fertility
rate of 2 children per women would correspond to n = 1 in this model.
14To be precise, lifetime-equal histories mean total lifetime-equal histories, in the sense that
it is the total sum of the lifetimes of all agents that is equal across histories. In the rest of the
paper, we will use the term lifetime-equal historiesfor short.
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 Denition D2 Two histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng are lifetime-equal if
and only if these exhibit an equal total number of life-periods.
Note that the total number of life-periods for the rst cohort (i.e. the pio-
neers), denoted by P0, is15
P0 = L+ SL+ S
2L+ ::: = L
1
1  S
The total number of life-periods for the second cohort, denoted by P1, is
P1 = SLn+ S
2Ln+ S3Ln+ ::: = LSn
1
1  S
One can then dene the total number of life-periods for all other cohorts,
denoted by P2, P3, ... etc. The total number of life-periods for a cohort j is
Pj = Ln
jSj
1
1  S
Hence the total number of life-periods, denoted by P , is
P =
1X
t=0
Pt = L
1
1  S
 
1 + nS + n2S2 + :::

Note that P is innite if nS  1. However, for nS < 1, we have
P =
L
(1  S)(1  nS)
That ratio can be decomposed in two factors: 11 S is the average longevity
for any person, that is, the inverse of the strength of mortality, whereas L1 nS is
the total number of persons ever born: it is the product of the initial population
size L and the strength of fertility 11 nS (i.e. the average number of descendants
for each person in the initial population). Thus the product of those two factors
1
1 S and
L
1 nS yields the total number of life-periods P .
Note that the total number of life-periods is increasing in the initial popu-
lation size L (i.e. @P@L > 0), increasing in the survival rate S (i.e.
@P
@S > 0), and
also increasing in the fertility rate n (@P@n > 0).
In order to remain within the eld of nite ethics, we will, in Sections 3 and
4, concentrate on the case where nS < 1, guaranteeing a nite total number of
life-periods, that is, a mankind history of nite length.16
 Assumption A10 Only a nite number of life-periods will be lived on
the spaceship: nS < 1.
Assumption A10 can be regarded as a constraint resulting from the niteness
of, let us say, the stock of some non-renewable natural resources present on
15 In this paper, we mean, by a life-period, a period lived by someone. For instance, if
two persons live one period, we say that the total number of life-periods equals two.
16See Section 5 for a study of the case where nS = 1.
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the spaceship.17 Under A10, we focus on lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng and
f~L; ~S; ~ng, which, by denition, are such that:
L
(1  S)(1  nS) =
~L
(1  ~S)(1  ~n ~S)
For a given number of pioneers (i.e. L = ~L), an equal number of life-periods
(i.e. P = ~P ) means that if one lifetime-equal history exhibits a higher fertility
n than another one, it must also exhibit a lower survival rate S.
Whereas the comparison of lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng
can take various forms, we will start with the simple case where there is no
possibility for the initial population to reproduce itself (i.e. n = ~n = 0). Then,
in a second stage, we will consider the case where reproduction exists, so that
new people can appear at each point in time (n > 0 and nS < 1). Finally, we will
turn to the case where nS = 1, which yields an innite number of periods lived
by a population, whose size converges asymptotically towards some constant.
3 The spaceship problem (1): no reproduction
This section examines a simplied version of the spaceship problem, in which
the population cannot reproduce itself. That subcase of the spaceship problem
will be referred to as the spaceship problem without reproduction. The absence
of reproduction amounts to assuming the following.
 Assumption A11 The fertility rate n is equal to 0.
Under A11, all new people are concentrated on the rst period, t = 0, and
form the initial population L of nite size. The total number of periods P lived
by a population of initial size L is:
P = L+ SL+ S2L+ ::: = L
1
1  S
Thus, if S tends towards 0, P tends towards L: the number of life-periods
equals the number of persons. However, if S tends towards 1, P tends towards
+1: as there is no death, the number of life-periods is innite.18
Hence, in the spaceship problem without reproduction, comparing two lifetime-
equal histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g amounts to comparing two histories for
which:
17Note that assuming nS < 1 yields a total population at time t that converges asymptoti-
cally towards 0. Indeed, writing Lt the number of people alive at time t, we have
L1 = lim
t!1Lt = LS
1 + (LSn)S1 1 + (LS2n2)S1 2 + :::+ L(S1n1)Sn = 0
as S < 1. Thus, our spaceship will, under nS < 1, end up empty in the long-run. But this
asymptotic emptyness does not prevent a temporary growth of the spaceship population: the
only thing that it prevents is a permanent growth or a stationary positive size.
18 It follows from the previous formulae that, if S tends to 1, the space available per person
qt is constant over time and equal to Q=L, as: limS!1 qt = limS!1 QStL =
Q
L
. In that case,
the population that is alive initially will remain forever in the spaceship, and will enjoy the
same space conditions during their whole life. On the contrary, if S tends towards 0, qt tends
to be innite for any t > 0, as: limS!0 qt = limS!0 QStL =
Q
0
= +1. Indeed, as S tends
towards 0, the survivors can enjoy an innitely large space at each period.
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L
1
1  S =
~L
1
1  ~S
which can be rewritten:
L
~L
=
1  S
1  ~S
that is, there is an equality of the ratios of initial populations (LHS) and
strengths of mortality (RHS) for histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g having an equal
number of life-periods. If one history exhibits a larger initial population than
another history with the same total number of life-periods (i.e. L > ~L), it must
also be characterized by a larger mortality (i.e. 1  S > 1  ~S).
3.1 The Classical Utilitarian solution
According to Classical Utilitarianism (CU), as rstly stated by Bentham (1789),
all actions - at the individual and institutional levels - should be chosen in
such a way as to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, in
conformity with the Principle of Utility. That principle must also govern the
choice of histories in general, and, in particular, of lifetime-equal histories.19
 Denition D3 A social planner is Classical Utilitarian (CU) if and only
if, when facing two histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng, he prefers the history
yielding the highest total welfare, that is,
fL; S; ng  f~L; ~S; ~ng ()P1t=0 Ltu(qt) P1t=0 ~Ltu(~qt)
Regarding the preferences  of a CU social planner over lifetime-equal histo-
ries, Proposition 1 states a general result: a CU social planner prefers lifetime-
equal histories with the smallest population size and the largest life expectancy.
Proposition 1 Assume A1-A11. Consider two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g
and f~L; ~S; 0g, with L > ~L and S < ~S. A CU planner prefers f~L; ~S; 0g to
fL; S; 0g, whatever the levels of Q,  and .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result stated in Proposition 1 is quite surprising, as the existing litera-
ture on normative population ethics has, since Parts (1984) Repugnant Con-
clusion, highlighted the tendency of CU to lead to excessively large populations
with low levels of utility per person, a recommendation regarded as repugnant
by many theorists. On the contrary, Proposition 1 states that, when facing a
choice between lifetime-equal histories, CU selects the history with the smallest
population. We are thus far from the populationism associated with CU.
While a proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix, we can give here
some intuition behind CUs preference for small populations.20 Actually, if one
computes the marginal social welfare gain from raising L while maintaining the
19Note that the Benthamite objective function does not involve any discounting here, in
conformity with Ramseys (1928) views. Note also that the above formula presents social
welfare by aggregating across time periods rather than persons (as usually done), but this is
equivalent to aggregating across people, because of the additivity of lifetime welfare.
20 It should be stressed here that Assumption A5 is a major driving force for that result. If
we added, instead of A5, temporal welfare invariant to qt above some threshold of qt, then
Proposition 1 would no longer be true.
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total number of life-periods L=(1 S) constant, one can see that such a marginal
social welfare gain is, under CU, necessarily negative.21 Thus adding one more
being while reducing the expected lifetime of all existing beings in such a way
as to maintain total lifetime constant is welfare-reducing under CU.
Note also that Proposition is quite general, as this holds whatever the total
space Q is, and for all values of preference parameters  and . That latter point
is surprising, as we would expect  to matter for choices between alternatives
involving unequal longevities. However, the total number of life-periods is the
same in all lifetime-equal histories, and this explains why  is neutral here.
Finally, let us turn to two extreme cases.22
 Corollary C1 Under  = 0, a CU planner is indi¤erent between any
lifetime-equal histories.
When  = 0, space does not matter at all: only existence matters, and,
given the equal number of life-periods in each history, indi¤erence must prevail,
under CU, between all lifetime-equal histories.
 Corollary C2 Under  = 1, a CU planner is indi¤erent between any
lifetime-equal histories.
If temporal welfare is linear in qt, the CU planner is indi¤erent between all
lifetime-equal histories, as the initial population L and the survival rate S a¤ect
social welfare in an identical manner in that case.
3.2 Average Utilitarianism
Although accepted as an ethical basis in various issues, CU faces intuitive dif-
culties in the eld of population ethics. A major critique of CU consists of
Parts (1984) Repugnant Conclusion: for any population with a signicant
welfare per head, there exists a larger population of individuals with a very low
welfare level, but which is ranked as better by CU (the rise in the quantity
of lives compensating the fall in the quality of lives). Note, however, that CU
does not, in the present context, yield to any populationism. As shown in the
previous subsection, CU selects, on the contrary, the lifetime-equal history with
the smallest initial population L and the largest survival rate S.
21Actually, social welfare W under a history fL; S; 0g can be written as
W =
1X
t=0
Wt = L
1 Q
1
1  S1  +
L
1  S 
Hence the marginal welfare gain from raising L while reducing S in such a way as to keep
L=(1  S) constant is
@W c
@L
 @W
@L
+
@W
@S
@S
@L
where @W
c
@L
is the change in welfare induced by a change in L compensated by a change in
S to maintain L=(1   S) constant. Clearly, for a total number of periods lived P , we have
S = 1  L
P
and thus @S
@L
=   1
P
. Thus we have, after simplications:
@W c
@L
= L Q(1  )

1  S 
(1  S1 )2

+
1
1  S 

1  1
1  S

< 0
That expression is negative, as 0 < S < 1.
22See the Appendix for proofs.
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Having stressed this, it remains that CU is only one normative criterion
among others, which also deserve attention when examining the spaceship prob-
lem. Let us thus consider an alternative criterion, Average Utilitarianism (AU).23
 Denition D4 A social planner is Average Utilitarian (AU) if and only
if, when facing two histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng, he prefers the history
yielding the highest welfare per existing person, that is,
fL; S; ng  f~L; ~S; ~ng
() 1  Sn
L
1X
t=0
Ltu(qt)  1 
~S~n
~L
1X
t=0
~Ltu(~qt)
where 1 SnL is the inverse of the total number of existing persons under
an initial population L, a survival rate S and a fertility rate n.
As stated below, the social ordering over histories under AU may, under
some conditions, di¤er signicantly from the one under CU.
Proposition 2 Assume A1-A11. Consider two histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g,
with L > ~L and S < ~S.
- If   0, an AU planner prefers f~L; ~S; 0g to fL; S; 0g, whatever the levels
of Q and . That is, any increase in S is regarded as better, and any decrease
in L is regarded as better, independently from any relation between L and S.
- If  < 0, given two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g, with
L > ~L and S < ~S, an AU planner prefers fL; S; 0g to f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if
  Q
L (1  ~S)(1  S)
( ~S   S)(1  S) 
"
(1  S) 
1  S1   
(1  ~S) 
1  ~S1 
#
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 is quite surprising, as one would expect AU to lead to a prefer-
ence for histories with a low L and a high S in all cases, exactly as CU. However,
as stated in Proposition 2, this is not the case, and thus the standard view of
AU as an antipopulationist ethical doctrine needs to be amended. Clearly, the
social planners preferences over lifetime-equal histories depend signicantly on
the level of the intercept of the temporal utility function .
If  is non-negative, AU recommends the lifetime-equal history with the
smallest L and the largest S, exactly as CU. Note, however, that, under   0,
the preference of the social planner for lifetime-equal histories with few initial
persons and large life expectancies is here even stronger than under CU. Indeed,
Proposition 2 states that the social planners preference for histories with low
L and high S prevails whatever the relation between L and S is, that is, even if
one departs from the comparison of lifetime-equal histories.
Nevertheless, if  is negative, then it is no longer obvious that AU recom-
mends histories with low L and large S. Actually, the opposite may be true,
provided the intercept  is su¢ ciently negative. Indeed, for a su¢ ciently low
23Regarding the sources of AU, it was argued by Gottlieb (1945) that Mill supported AU
implicitly, because he argued in favour of the control of births on the grounds of social welfare
(see Mill 1859, p. 242). However, it is Sidgwick (1874, p. 415-416) who rst made the explicit
distinction between total utility and average utility.
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level of , an AU planner prefers fL; S; 0g to f~L; ~S; 0g, contrary to what pre-
vails under CU. Thus, for a very low intercept , the antipopulationist bias of
AU is false, as this leads to a larger population in comparison to CU.24 The
intuition behind that result is that, under a very negative , it may be optimal,
under AU, to opt for a history with a larger L and a lower S, as this is a way
to dilutethe negative utility associated to the xed time of existence on more
people.25 A population made of a few long-lived agents who accumulate a large
stock of disutility, will, on average, be far worse o¤ than a population made of
lots of short-lived agents, who do not have enough lifetime to accumulate a very
negative lifetime welfare. This dilution e¤ect does not take place under CU, as
there, it is the total stock of disutility - rather than the stock per person - that
matters, and this total stock is constant for all lifetime-equal histories.
In sum, the present study contradicts common beliefs. CU is often accused
of populationism, and AU is generally suspected of antipopulationism. The
examination of the social ordering over lifetime-equal histories invalidates those
beliefs. CU recommends lifetime-equal histories with the smallest population,
whereas AU may involve the choice of a more populated history than CU.
3.3 Critical-Level Utilitarianism
After having studied the solutions to the spaceship problem under CU and
AU, let us now explore the solutions under alternative criteria of population
ethics. It was indeed shown in the literature that, whereas AU avoids the
Repugnant Conclusion, it su¤ers from another weakness, which was called the
Mere Addition Paradox by Part (1984). Clearly, AU regards as undesirable
the addition of a group of people with an individual welfare that is slightly lower
than the initial average welfare, even if the additional people have a life worth
living, and even if the added people do not inuence in any way the lives of the
initial group. In order to avoid that counter-intuitive result - but without facing
the Repugnant Conclusion - one solution proposed by Blackorby and Donaldson
(1984) consists of summing, instead of absolute utilities, the contributory values
of all lives, dened as the lifetime welfare of existing agents minus the critical
level of welfare u^ (u^  0), which makes life - as a whole - neutral. This yields
Critical-Level Utilitarianism (CLU): a rise in the population is desirable if the
24To see the intuition behind those results, note that, given @W
c
@L
 @W
@L
+ @W
@S
@S
@L
, we have
@W c
@L
=
( )L  1Q
1  S1  +

(1  )L QS 
(1  S1 )2 +

(1  S)2

@S
@L
If   0, that expression is negative, as the rst term is negative. Thus, if   0, the welfare
change induced by a rise in L is always negative, even when @S
@L
= 0. Hence the preference for
a low L does not require here @S
@L
< 0. Inversely, @W
c
@S
is always positive, even when @L
@S
= 0.
But if  < 0, it is no longer obvious that @W
c
@L
< 0, even when we compare lifetime-equal
histories (i.e. @S
@L
=   1
P
). Indeed, we then have
@W c
@L
=  

Q
L
 
L
1  S 
(1  S1 )2  
1
L (1  S)
Under  < 0, the rst term is negative and the second one is positive, so that the sign of
@W c
@L
is ambiguous, and depends on the two lifetime-equal histories under comparison.
25This dilution e¤ect presupposes that a xed time has to be lived (i.e. the total lifetime
has to be equal to P , and cannot be lower than P ). Of course, a social planner who could opt
for a total lifetime lower than P would, under  << 0, recommend no lifetime at all.
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welfare of additional people exceeds u^, and undesirable if it is lower than it.26
 Denition D5 A social planner is a Critical-Level Utilitarian (CLU) if
and only if, when facing two histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng, he prefers
the history yielding the highest total contributory values of lives, that is,
fL; S; ng  f~L; ~S; ~ng
()
1X
t=0
Ltu(qt)  L
1  Snu^ 
1X
t=0
~Ltu(~qt) 
~L
1  ~S~nu^
where u^ is the critical welfare level, making a whole life neutral, while
L
1 Sn is the total number of persons under an initial population L, and
survival and fertility rates S and n.
It is crucial here to distinguish the introduction of that neutral level for
existence u^ from the introduction of what Broome (2004) calls a neutral level
for continuing existence(i.e. a critical level dened for each period of life). The
introduction of such a critical level for continuing existence would not alter the
Benthamite condition for fL; S; 0g  f~L; ~S; 0g, unlike what is the case under
the introduction of a lifetime critical level u^:27
Under the assumption of no reproduction (n = ~n = 0), the preferences of a
CLU planner over lifetime-equal histories can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A11. Consider two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g
and f~L; ~S; 0g, with L > ~L and S < ~S. A CLU planner prefers f~L; ~S; 0g to
fL; S; 0g, whatever the levels of Q,  and .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, the introduction of a critical level of lifetime utility u^ does not a¤ect
the social planners preferences in comparison with what CU recommends. In
each case, the social planner will always prefer lifetime-equal histories with the
smallest initial population L and the largest survival rate S.28 This indepen-
dence of the social ordering from the critical lifetime welfare u^ is surprising. But
this result is also somewhat reassuring, as recent debates on the selection of an
adequate critical utility level seem largely open (see Crisp 2007; Broome 2007).
Thus it is good that the solution does not depend on u^.
Moreover, it should also be stressed that the social planners preferences do
not, unlike AU, depend on the intercept of the temporal utility function . The
26See Arrhenius (2008) for an extended discussion of CLU.
27To see this, note, in the comparison of two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g,
that social welfare under such a critical level ~u is: L

Q
L
 
1 + S1  + S2(1 ) + :::+ :::
 
L~u

1 + S + S2 + :::

+
L( ~u)
1 S = L

Q
L

1
1 s   Lu^ 11 S +
L( ~u)
1 S :
Hence, fL; S; 0g  f~L; ~S; 0g () L1 
1 S1   
~L1 
1  ~S1   0
as under CU, and we always have f~L; ~S; 0g  fL; S; 0g :
28 Indeed, the marginal e¤ect of a rise in L compensated by a change in S in such a way as
to maintain the total number of life-periods constant, @W
c
@L
= @W
@L
+ @W
@S
@S
@L
, is here:
Q
L
  (1  )(1  S )  S1  + (S1 )2
(1  S1 )2

  u^ < 0
That expression is always negative, whatever the level of ,  and Q.
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reason why  is benign here is that, as under CLU, we base the comparison of
histories on the total welfare (in net terms) for all life-periods. The total number
of life-periods is, by denition, the same for all lifetime-equal histories, and so
 has the same e¤ects in all histories under comparison. This was di¤erent
under AU, as there it was not the total utility of all life-periods that was under
comparison, but the utility of all life-periods divided by the number of persons,
which varies across lifetime-equal histories, so that  was far from benign.
3.4 Number-Dampened Utilitarianism
Although CLU was developed as an alternative to CU and AU, it is subject to
similar problems. If the critical level u^ is too low, the Repugnant Conclusion
arises, whereas if it is too high, the Mere Addition Paradox or the Sadistic
Conclusion prevails. This observation - and the di¢ culties to select a single
value of u^ - encouraged the development of other criteria.29
One of those alternative criteria is Ngs (1986) Number-Dampened Utilitar-
ianism (NDU).30 The value function under NDU is equal to the average utility
multiplied by a positive-valued function of the population size. When that
function is a multiple of the population size, that criterion is equivalent to CU,
whereas, if that function is a constant, NDU is equivalent to AU.
Under NDU, the problem of a social planner is to choose fL; S; ng in such a
way as to maximize the sum of all cohortss welfares, dened as the product of
the average utility in that cohort and a concave transform of its size.
 Denition D6 A social planner is Number-Dampened Utilitarian (NDU)
if and only if, when facing two histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng, he prefers
the history yielding the highest average welfare multiplied by a concave
transform of the existing population, that is,
fL; S; ng  f~L; ~S; ~ng
()

L
1  Sn
 "
1  Sn
L
1X
t=0
Ltu(qt)
#

 
~L
1  ~S~n
! "
1  ~S~n
~L
1X
t=0
~Ltu(~qt)
#
where 0    1.
Proposition 4 presents the preferences of a NDU social planner over lifetime-
equal histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g.
Proposition 4 Assume A1-A11. Consider two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g
and f~L; ~S; 0g, with L > ~L and S < ~S.
- If   0, a NDU planner prefers f~L; ~S; 0g to fL; S; 0g, whatever the levels
of Q and .
- If  < 0, a NDU planner prefers fL; S; 0g to f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if
  Q
L (1  ~S)(1  S)
(1  S) 
h
(1  ~S)(1  S)1    (1  ~S)
i " (1  S) 
1  S1   
(1  ~S) 
1  ~S1 
#
29One solution is the adherence to Critical-Band Utilitarianism (see Blackorby et al 2005),
which allows some interval of individual welfare levels between which a life is neutral.
30On Number-Dampened Utilitarianism, see also Hurka (1983).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, under  equal to 1, the condition on  mentioned in the second
part of Proposition 4 is never valid, so that we are then back to the ranking
of the CU social planner: the lifetime-equal history with the lowest L and the
largest S is preferred to other lifetime-equal histories, whatever ,  and Q
are.31 Moreover, under  equal to 0, the condition mentioned in the second
part of Proposition 4 collapses to the one in Proposition 2, so that the ranking
of NDU on lifetime-equal histories is then equivalent to the one under AU.
Let us now contrast the above solution with the one under an alternative
generalization of standard utilitarian criteria: CLU. A fundamental di¤erence
between NDU and CLU lies in the fact that the ordering of a NDU planner over
lifetime-equal histories does not necessarily lead to the choice of the history with
the smallest L and the largest S, unlike CLU. Such a di¤erence is surprising,
as CLU and NDU are generally regarded as common generalizations of CU and
AU. The spaceship problem in its simplest form reveals that there is a strong
division between, on the one hand, CU and CLU, which both always lead to
the selection of the lifetime-equal history with the lowest L and the largest S,
whatever the intercept of temporal utility  is, and, on the other hand, AU and
NDU, for which the solution depends on the level of . For those two criteria,
it may be optimal, under a very negative , to opt for a history with an initial
population that is larger than the minimum one, in such a way as to dilute the
xed, miserable total lifetime on a larger number of persons.32 Such a dilution
does not occur under CU and CLU, for which increasing the population size
does not bring any improvement (as dilution is here impossible).
3.5 A synthesis
Let us now collect our results regarding the social ranking of lifetime-equal
histories in a spaceship problem without reproduction. For that purpose, Table
1 shows the sensitivity - or, alternatively, the invariance - of the social ranking
of lifetime-equal histories to the structural parameters of the economy, under
the four population ethics criteria under study.
31This is the case because, when  = 1, the denominator of the rst factor of the RHS is
0, and the second factor is negative, so that the RHS equals  1. Hence  cannot be smaller
than the RHS, and thus the condition on  is never satised.
32To see here why a dilution of lifetime on more people may be socially desirable under
NDU, we can, here again, compute the welfare change from a rise in L compensated by a fall
in S in such a way as to maintain the total lifetime constant, i.e. @W
c
@L
= @W
@L
+ @W
@S
@S
@L
:
L 1

Q
L
 "    + (1  )S1    (1  )S 
(1  S1 )2
#
  L
 1(1  )
1  S
The term in brackets is negative. Hence, given that the second term is also negative if
 > 0, we have that @W
c
@L
< 0 under   0. But once  < 0, the second term is positive, and
adding new persons while reducing S may be welfare-increasing, as under AU.
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Table 1: The spaceship problem without reproduction
Parameters Q  
Criteria Impact on
fL; S; 0g  f~L; ~S; 0g
CU no no no
AU no if   0 no if   0 no if   0
yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0
CLU no no no
NDU no if   0 no if   0 no if   0
yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0
Table 1 illustrates the major division between our four normative criteria:
whereas rankings of lifetime-equal histories under CU and CLU are invariant
to the total available space, as well as to individual preferences, the same is
not true under AU and NDU once  is negative. Therefore, the sign of the
intercept of the temporal utility function is a major discriminant factor among
our normative criteria. When   0, the social planner selects the lifetime-equal
history with the lowest initial population and the largest survival rate, under
all utilitarian criteria. However, if  < 0, the solutions under AU and NDU
become dependent on the total available space and the preference parameter .
In sum, there are two distinct ways to interpret Table 1. On the one hand,
one may start from what one regards as a morally relevant or a simply em-
pirically observable piece of information, and select, on the basis of that, a
normative criterion. On the other hand, one may, from the start, opt for one
criterion, and then consider what a¤ects the solution under that particular view.
If one has no obvious reason to believe in a particular population ethics
criterion a priori, Table 1 will be interpreted in the former way, and one can
then advocate in favour of CU or CLU on several distinct grounds. For instance,
CU and CLU do not require any information on individual preferences to give
a solution to the spaceship problem without reproduction. Given the di¢ culty
to estimate  empirically, the invariance of rankings to  can be regarded as a
strong argument in favour of CU and CLU. Alternatively, one may argue that
the solution to the spaceship problem should be invariant to the spaceship size
Q, and defend CU and CLU on those grounds.33
4 The spaceship problem (2): reproduction
Let us now turn to the more general problem where the population of the
spaceship can reproduce itself. This amounts to relaxing the postulate of a zero
fertility rate n (i.e. Assumption A11). That more general spaceship problem
can be regarded as including the widely debated issue of the optimal population
existing on the Earth. After all, the Earth can be regarded as a spaceship with
living conditions allowing the reproduction of its population.
To study the spaceship problem with reproduction, we will, here again, ex-
amine how a social planner ranks lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng.
33The intuition supporting the property of invariance to Q is the following: once the total
time to be lived is xed, why should the discovery of a new place to live (e.g. a new galaxy)
question the past selection of the best history? Given the - so far unnished - exploration
of the Universe, one may want the current solution of the spaceship problem - i.e. given the
currently known Q - to remain valid even if one discovers a new place in the future.
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For the ease of presentation, we consider here the comparison of lifetime-equal
histories with the same initial population sizes (i.e. L = ~L), that is, the number
of pioneers is equal in all histories. Such a way to proceed is actually quite
natural, as the population of the Earth (or any other spaceship) is what it is,
so that a social planner governing a spaceship has no other choice than to take
the initial population L as given. Indeed, from a policy perspective, the only
possible interventions concern future fertility n or longevity 1=1   S, but one
can hardly change the initial population size L. Thus assuming common initial
populations L = ~L seems plausible.
 Assumption A12 The initial population size L is equal in all histories.
Under L = ~L, and assuming a nite number of life-periods (i.e. Sn < 1),
lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng are such that
1
(1  S)(1  nS) =
1
(1  ~S)(1  ~n ~S)
A history with longer lives will also exhibit, for a given total number of
life-periods, a lower fertility: S  ~S () n  ~n. In the spaceship problem
with reproduction, comparing two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng
amounts to comparing two histories for which:
1  ~S
1  S =
1  nS
1  ~n ~S
that is, there is an equality of the ratios of strength of mortality [i.e. 1 S] (LHS)
and strengths of fertility [i.e. 11 nS ] (RHS) for histories fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng
having an equal number of life-periods (i.e. for which P = ~P ). Intuitively, if
one history exhibits a larger fertility (i.e. 1
1 ~n ~S >
1
1 nS ) than another history
with the same total number of life-periods, it must also be characterized by a
larger strength of mortality (i.e. 1  ~S > 1  S).
4.1 The Classical Utilitarian solution
As in the problem without reproduction, it is tempting to believe, at rst glance,
that CU will exhibit a populationist bias, and lead to the selection of a large
fertility rate and a low survival rate. However, Proposition 5 suggests that this
is not necessarily the case.
Proposition 5 Assume A1-A10 and A12. Consider two lifetime-equal histo-
ries fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng, with S < ~S and n > ~n. The CU planner prefers
fL; S; ng to fL; ~S; ~ng if and only if:
1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 

1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 
Proof. See the Appendix.
As in the problem without reproduction, the rankings under CU are indepen-
dent from the size of the spaceship Q. Moreover, the social ordering of lifetime-
equal histories is also independent from the intercept . Furthermore, the initial
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size of the population, L, has no e¤ect on the social ordering over lifetime-equal
histories. Thus whatever the initial population is, CU ranks lifetime-equal histo-
ries in the same manner. For those who appreciate the independence of rankings
from the past, that property of CU is highly valuable.
However, note that, despite some common aspects with the spaceship prob-
lem without reproduction (e.g. independence of the solution from Q and ),
there exists, nonetheless, a fundamental di¤erence between Propositions 1 and
5. Whereas CU leads, in the absence of reproduction, to the selection of the
history with the lowest L and the highest S, it is di¢ cult here to see whether
CU recommends a population with a high survival and a low fertility or the op-
posite. Di¤erent combinations of n and S yield di¤erent intertemporal paths of
qt, and the ranking of lifetime-equal histories depends on how sensitive temporal
welfare is to the space available for each person (i.e. the parameter ).
Thus, the introduction of reproduction on the spaceship alters the conclu-
sions drawn in the no reproduction case. Under 0 <  < 1, it is now hard
to see whether a CU planner would opt for a pre-demographic transition state
(i.e. with a high n and a low S), or, alternatively, for a post-demographic tran-
sition state (i.e. with a low n and a high S), as long as the total number of
life-periods is the same, whereas, in the problem without reproduction, the CU
solution always consisted in choosing the highest survival rate.
Finally, note that it is nonetheless possible to see what the CU social ranking
in the extreme cases where  = 0 and  = 1.34
 Corollary C3 Under  = 0, the CU planner is indi¤erent between any
lifetime-equal histories.
 Corollary C4 Under  = 1, the CU planner is indi¤erent between any
lifetime-equal histories.
4.2 Average Utilitarianism
AU yields an ambiguous ranking in the absence of reproduction, depending on
the intercept of the temporal utility function . Once reproduction is allowed,
things do not become more clear, as stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Assume A1 to A10 and A12. Consider two lifetime-equal his-
tories fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng, with S < ~S and n > ~n. The AU planner prefers
fL; S; ng to fL; ~S; ~ng if and only if:
1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
 1  S
1  ~S
1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 
 Q
 L
1  Sn

1
1  ~S  
1
1  S

or, in terms of ,
  Q
L (1  Sn)(1  ~S)(1  S)
~S   S
" 1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
  1  S
1  ~S
1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 #
Proof. See the Appendix.
Contrary to Proposition 5, three factors a¤ect the social ranking of lifetime-
equal histories. First, the intercept of the temporal utility function ; second,
34See the Appendix for the proof.
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the total space available Q; third, the initial population size L. All this makes
the AU solution likely to di¤er from the CU solution. Let us briey examine
the impact of those three determinants of the social ordering.
The impact of  depends on its sign. Clearly, whatever  is positive or
negative, the LHS of the rst condition in Proposition 6 is smaller than the
LHS in Proposition 5. Hence, if   0, AU recommends a lifetime-equal history
with a higher S and a lower n in comparison with the one under CU. However,
under  < 0, the RHS of the rst condition in Proposition 6 becomes negative,
so that it is no longer certain that AU selects a lifetime-equal history with a
higher S and a lower n than CU. We may actually observe the opposite, because
of the dilution e¤ect mentioned in the problem without reproduction.
Regarding the impact of the available space Q, it is easy to see that the
smaller Q is, the larger the RHS of the rst condition in Proposition 6 is, so
that lifetime-equal histories with a high S and a low n are more likely to be
selected (under   0). The opposite prevails under  su¢ ciently negative, on
the grounds of the dilution e¤ect (see above).
As far as the inuence of the initial population L is concerned, Proposition
6 suggests that the larger L is, the larger the RHS of the rst condition for
fL; S; ng  fL; ~S; ~ng is, so that AU is more likely to select a lifetime-equal
history with a high S and a low n, under   0. However, under  < 0, a larger
L may make the dilution of misery necessary, leading to a lifetime-equal history
with a high n and a low S. The AU solution is thus, unlike the CU solution,
dependent on the initial population size, and, thus, dependent on the past.
Finally, it should be noticed that the AU solution di¤ers here from what
it is in the absence of reproduction. True, as without reproduction, AU does
not necessarily lead to the selection of the lifetime-equal history with the low-
est population size and the largest life expectancy when temporal welfare is
negative. But, more importantly, even for a non-negative  is the selection of
lifetime-equal histories with the highest S no longer certain here, contrary to
what prevailed in the absence of reproduction.
4.3 Critical-Level Utilitarianism
The preferences of a CLU social planner over lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng
and fL; ~S; ~ng are characterized by Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 Assume A1 to A10 and A12. Consider two lifetime-equal his-
tories fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng, with S < ~S and n > ~n. The CLU planner prefers
fL; S; ng to fL; ~S; ~ng if and only if:
1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
 
1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 


Q
L
 
u^

1
1  nS  
1
1  ~n ~S

Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, under u^ = 0, the condition stated in Proposition 7 collapses
to the condition under CU (Proposition 5). Note also that, under u^ equal to
average lifetime welfare, the condition for fL; S; ng  fL; ~S; ~ng coincides with
the condition under AU (Proposition 6). Therefore, we can interpret CLU as a
natural generalization of CU and AU.
Having stressed this, it remains that the CLU solution to the spaceship
problem remains somewhat closer, in some sense, of the CU one in comparison to
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the AU one. The reason why this is so is that the condition stated in Proposition
7 does not depend on , exactly like the condition under CU. That result is
somewhat surprising, as one would expect the ranking under CLU to depend on
how large the critical level u^ is with respect to the intercept . But here again,
and exactly as in the case of CU, the level of the intercept of the temporal utility
function does not matter.
However, the proximity of the CLU and CU solutions has some limits.
Firstly, the size of the initial population L inuences the solution of the space-
ship problem here, unlike under CU. The larger L is, the more likely the pref-
erence for a lifetime-equal history with a lower fertility and a lower mortality
is. Thus, the extent to which the demographic transition is valuable depends,
under a xed available space, on the size of the population that undergoes the
transition. The larger the population is, the more benecial the demographic
transition is. Secondly, note that the solution to the spaceship problem with
reproduction depends, under CLU, on the spaceship size Q, unlike what it was
the case under CU. This constitutes another important distinction between the
two normative criteria in the present context.
4.4 Number-Dampened Utilitarianism
Let us now consider the rankings induced by NDU over lifetime-equal histories.
Proposition 8 Assume A1 to A10 and A12. Consider two lifetime-equal his-
tories fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng, with ~S > S and n > ~n. The NDU planner prefers
fL; S; ng to fL; ~S; ~ng if and only if:
1X
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or, in terms of ,
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Proof. See the Appendix.
If  equals 1, the condition for fL; S; ng 
n
L; ~S; ~n
o
coincides with the
one under CU (Proposition 5), while, under  equal to 0, we are back to the
AU condition (Proposition 6). Thus, exactly as in the absence of reproduction,
NDU is, like CLU, a generalization of standard utilitarian criteria.
However, a signicant di¤erence remains between the two criteria: the or-
dering under CLU over lifetime-equal histories is invariant to the intercept of
the temporal utility function , contrary to the ordering under NDU, which
depends on whether  is positive or negative, large or small. That result does
not surprise us, as this was already present in the simpler version of the space-
ship problem considered in Section 3. But the present analysis reveals that this
fundamental di¤erence between CLU and NDU is robust to the introduction of
reproduction on the spaceship.
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4.5 A synthesis
To sum up, Table 2 shows the determinants of the social ranking of lifetime-equal
histories in the spaceship problem with reproduction.
Table 2: The spaceship problem with reproduction
Parameters Q L  
Criteria Impact on
fL; S; ng  fL; ~S; ~ng
CU no no no yes
AU yes yes yes yes
CLU yes yes no yes
NDU yes yes yes yes
Table 2 illustrates that our four normative criteria are not sensitive to the
same information. The CU solution is the only one that is invariant to the
spaceship size Q and to the initial population L. Hence, for decision-makers
who would like their decisions to be independent from the past, CU seems to
be the adequate criterion. The three other criteria depend all on how large
the initial population is, and on how large the spaceship is. But those three
remaining criteria di¤er from each others, as the AU and the NDU solutions
depend on the intercept of the temporal utility function , contrary to the CLU
solution. Therefore if one considers that  cannot be observed, and, thus, cannot
serve as a basis for the social planners ranking, it follows that, if Q and L are
regarded as relevant, only the CLU solution is adequate. Finally, note that the
AU and NDU solutions are both dependent on the four factors explicitly listed
in Table 2. Thus those two normative criteria are equally demanding in terms
of information, and di¤er only in how that information is treated.
The comparison of Table 2 (spaceship with reproduction) with Table 1
(spaceship without reproduction) shows that the parameter , which captures
the sensitivity of temporal welfare to space per head, plays now a crucial role
whatever the criterion is, unlike what was the case in the absence of reproduc-
tion, where  was benign (except under a negative  under AU and NDU).
The role of other parameters is also strengthened once reproduction is in-
troduced. The total space available Q was, in general, benign in the absence of
reproduction (except under a negative  under AU and NDU), but once repro-
duction is allowed, Q becomes a major variable for all normative criteria except
CU. Moreover, the intercept  plays now a signicant role than in the spaceship
problem without reproduction.
5 The spaceship problem (3): stationary space-
ship
While we focused so far on a spaceship whose population would only enjoy,
as a whole, a nite total number of life-periods, that restriction may appear
quite pessimistic, as this implies a population that will vanish asymptotically
towards 0 (even though it may exhibit some growth during a part of history).
That niteness assumption, although analytically convenient, presupposed the
impossibility for Mankind to have an innite history, because of some constraints
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preventing the perpetual survival of life in the spaceship. In the case of human-
made spaceships like rockets, this constraint would follow, for instance, from
a limit in the quantity of oxygen available. But in the case of more complex
spaceships with ecosystems (like the Earth), this restriction seems less plausible.
If one believes in human capacity to overcome technical di¢ culties, the nite-
ness assumption Sn < 1 must be relaxed. This is the reason why we will here
depart from A10, and consider instead the case of a stationary spaceship, that
is, a spaceship with a nite constant asymptotic population. Actually, it is not
di¢ cult to see that the constancy of the asymptotic population requires, in this
framework, nothing else than nS = 1. Indeed, the constancy of the population
at a given point in time requires an equality of births and deaths
L(Stnt) =
L(Stnt)
Sn
(1  S) + L(S
tnt)
S2n2
S(1  S) + :::+ LSt 1(1  S)
=
L(Stnt)
Sn
(1  S)

1 +
1
n
+
1
n2
+ :::+
1
nt 1

Hence a constant asymptotic population (i.e. t!1) requires
1 =
1  S
Sn  S
If 1 SSn S > 1, the population tends to zero asymptotically, as the long-run
number of deaths exceeds the long-run number of births. On the contrary, if
1 S
Sn S < 1, the population tends to innity, as the long-run number of births
exceeds the long-run number of deaths. Finally, it is only under 1 SSn S = 1, that
is, under Sn = 1, that the population is asymptotically constant. This is the
assumption we will make in this section.
 Assumption A13 The population of the spaceship converges asymptot-
ically towards a positive constant, i.e. Sn = 1.
Note that, under that assumption, the long-run level of the population of
the spaceship will be exactly equal to the total number of life-periods under no
reproduction on the spaceship. That equivalence result is stated below.
Proposition 9 Under an initial population L, a survival rate S and a fertility
rate n such that nS = 1, the long-run population size equals the total number of
life-periods in the absence of reproduction, i.e. L1 S .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind that equivalence result is the following. Both numbers
- the total number of life-periods under n = 0 and the total population size
- have, at time 0, the same level, equal to L. The number of periods under
n = 0 becomes, at time 1, equal to L+ LS, while the number of persons under
nS = 1 becomes, at time 1, equal to SL+ SLn, which is SL+L. At t = 2, the
total number of periods in the spaceship without reproduction is L+SL+S2L,
while the number of persons under nS = 1 is S2L + S2Ln + S2Ln2, that is,
S2L+ SL+ L, and so forth. We are thus in presence of two sums whose terms
are the same, yielding Proposition 9.
Having stressed that equivalence result, there remains a fundamental dif-
ference between a spaceship without reproduction and a stationary spaceship:
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while the former involves a nite number of life-periods, the latter involves an
innite number of life-periods. Formally, the total number of life-periods is
P =
L
(1  S)(1  Sn)
so that, under Sn = 1, the number of life-periods is innite. Hence any two
histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng with Sn = ~S~n = 1 have an innite P .
The non-niteness of total lifetimes is really problematic for an aggregative
doctrine like utilitarianism, whatever the precise form it takes, because such
an aggregative doctrine aims at taking into account the utilities at all life-
periods, so that the innity of life-periods makes the utilitarian planner deal
with quantities that are no longer nite. There exist two broad families of
solutions to that problem. On the one hand, one can depart from utilitarianism,
and turn towards a less aggregative ethical standard (e.g. adopting a Maximin
objective focusing on the worse-o¤ cohort). On the other hand, one may keep
the utilitarian doctrine, but restrict the informational basis that is taken into
account.
In the rest of this section, we will take the second road, and remain within
utilitarianism. What we shall do is to reduce social welfare comparisons to
what prevails at the stationary state, that is, at the population level that, once
reached, will prevail forever in the spaceship. In other words, we will concentrate
on the living conditions faced by all generations succeeding to each others once
the steady-state is reached, each generation enjoying a nite life, and giving birth
to another generation that will also enjoy exactly the same living conditions (i.e.
same space per head). That focus on the stationary state is a way to extractthe
spaceship from time, that is, from history. This means that all things occurring
outside the steady-state will not be taken into account here.35
Therefore, in order to characterize the solutions of the stationary spaceship
problem, we will, in this section, focus on histories that are not only lifetime-
equal, which is the case of all histories under Sn = 1, but on histories that are
population-equal, in the sense that these yield the same long-run population.
 Denition D7 Two histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng are population-equal
if these yield the same asymptotic population size, that is, if and only if
L
1  S =
~L
1  ~S
Note that, given Sn = 1, the comparison of population-equal histories
amounts to focusing on two demographic parameters: the size of the pioneer
group, L, and the survival proportion S. Here again, this leads us back, in
some way, to the spaceship problem without reproduction: comparing two
population-equal histories fL; S; ng and f~L; ~S; ~ng amounts to comparing his-
tories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg with L1 S =
~L
1  ~S , exactly as the spaceship
problem without reproduction amounts to comparing histories fL; S; 0g and
f~L; ~S; 0g with L1 S =
~L
1  ~S :
35Naturally, such a reduction, which is allowed by the existence of a state of constant
population, is far from neutral on ethical grounds: ignoring a whole span of history and
concentrating on a timelessspaceship is obviously a simplication. However, given that the
stationary state will be faced by an innite number of people, the reduction of history to the
timeless stationary spaceship seems legitimate, as a rst approximation.
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5.1 The Instantaneous View
Let us now examine how two population-equal histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg,
with L > ~L and S < ~S, are ranked by a utilitarian social planner focusing on
the stationary state of the spaceship.
For that purpose, we will rst consider a planner who compares population-
equal histories by investigating which one yields the largest instantaneous social
welfare at the steady-state, that is, the largest social welfare during one period
of time, once the spaceship is stationary in population size.
 Denition D8 A social planner adheres to the Instantaneous View (IV),
if, when comparing two population-equal histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg
with L > ~L and S < ~S, he prefers the history yielding the highest social
welfare during one period of time at the steady-state, i.e. W :
fL; S; 1=Sg  f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg () W  (L; S; 1=S) W (~L; ~S; 1= ~S)
As stated in Proposition 10, IV yields to a general indi¤erence between all
population-equal histories, whatever the utilitarian criterion used.36
Proposition 10 Assume A1 to A9 and A13. Consider two population-equal
histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg, with L > ~L and S < ~S. Under CU, AU,
CLU or NDU, an IV planner regards fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg as equivalent.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 10 is a negative result, as it is of the anything goestype. Cer-
tainly all population-equal histories should not be regarded as equivalent. Hav-
ing a population of long-lived or short-lived people, cannot be considered as the
same thing, even though the total number of people alive in the long-run is the
same. Thus reducing the informational basis to the mere steady-state social wel-
fare per period is a far too strong reduction, which makes all population-equal
histories look the same, despite their strong demographic di¤erences.
Those di¤erences in fertility and longevity are ignored here, as the histo-
ries compared are characterized by an equal long-run population size, which is
the only piece of demographic information that matters from an IV perspec-
tive. Thus, one should not expect from IV to be able to discriminate between
population-equal histories.
In order to avoid this anything goes result, an alternative solution is to
dene social welfare as the sum of the lifetime welfares of the members of the
long-run population, instead of their instantaneous welfares. This approach will
be coined the posterity view.
5.2 The Posterity View
The intuition behind that extension of the informational basis is merely that,
even though the asymptotic population size is equal in two histories fL; S; 1=Sg
and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg, whether a life is, on average, longer in the latter than in the
former is not something irrelevant, but, rather, should be taken into account.
36 Indeed, each utilitarian criterion is only sensitive to the population size (which is equal
in all histories), and not to its age-structure.
24
 Denition D9 A social planner adheres to the Posterity View (PV), if,
when comparing two population-equal histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg
with L > ~L and S < ~S, he prefers the history yielding the highest lifetime
welfare for a cohort, the spaceship being in its stationary state
fL; S; 1=Sg  f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg () W
 (L; S; 1=S)
1  S 
W (~L; ~S; 1= ~S)
1  ~S
As stated below, the PV approach yields a preference for population-equal
histories with a small initial population and a large survival rate when   0.
Under  < 0, histories with a smaller initial population size and a larger life
expectancy are better only if temporal utility at the stationary state is non-
negative. Otherwise, PV selects histories with a large L and a low S, to dilute
the pain of existence on the largest number of persons.
Proposition 11 Assume A1 to A9 and A13. Consider two population-equal
histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg, with L > ~L and S < ~S. Under CU, AU,
CLU or NDU, the preferences of a PV planner are:
- If   0, f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg  fL; S; 1=Sg, whatever Q and  are.
- If  < 0, f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg  fL; S; 1=Sg if and only if   

Q(1 S)
L

.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Take any two population-equal histories. In the rst one, there is a large
number of pioneers and a small proportion of survivors and, thus, given nS =
1, a large fertility rate. In that history, people live short lives, and are, on
average, young. In the second one, there is a small number of pioneers, a large
proportion of survivors, and a low fertility rate, so that, in that second history,
people are, on average, older. At the steady-state, the two populations have
the same sizes, but di¤erent age-structures. If we only look at the aggregated
instantaneous welfare at the steady-state, the age-structure does not matter:
anything goes. But if one regards the aggregated lifetime welfare at the steady-
state, the ranking varies with the level of .
When   0, the history with the longest lives must be better. The reason
why this is the case is merely that the rst history can only achieve a large
population by a large turnover rate. But a high turnover rate is associated
with shorter lives, which is here damageable on a lifetime perspective, given
that temporal welfare is non-negative. Hence population-equal histories with
such a high turnover cannot meet posterity utilitarian requirements.
On the contrary, when  < 0, a history with the lowest turnover is not
necessarily better. If temporal utility is negative, it is better to have the highest
turnover, and, hence, to opt for the rst history. Note that whether temporal
utility is positive or negative at the stationary state depends on the postulated
asymptotic population size L1 S . The higher this is, the more likely is the
preference for a history with a large turnover and a low life expectancy, in such
a way as to dilute pain on the largest number of persons.
5.3 The Renewal View
After having studied the IV, yielding an overall indi¤erence between population-
equal histories, and the PV, which yields more ambiguous results, but, for 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su¢ ciently large, a preference for histories with long lives, it may be worthwhile,
for completeness, to consider the third alternative: the one in which, for a given
temporal welfare, the social planner prefers to observe a perpetual renewal of
the spaceship. Of course, under a stationary population, such a renewal of the
population can only come from the replacement of old members of the spaceship.
One can thus hardly advocate for renewal while condemning the turnover. The
posterity view and the renewal view are incompatible.
In the spaceship, the number of deaths at the stationary state is a fraction
1   S of the whole population, and is thus equal to (1   S) L1 S = L. There
are L persons leaving the spaceship at each period, and, given the stationary
population size, these are replaced by L new persons, who are actually born from
the survivors of the previous births, whose size is now LS, so that the newborns
are equal to LSn = L. Given that L is both the number of arrivals and the
number of departures from the stationary spaceship, it is a natural measure of
renewal. This can be used to weight temporal utility, the intuition being that
the lower the renewal rate is, the lower the weight assigned to temporal utility.
 Denition D10 A social planner adheres to the Renewal View (RV), if,
when comparing two population-equal histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg
with L > ~L and S < ~S, he prefers the history yielding the highest renewal-
weighted welfare for a cohort, the spaceship being in its stationary state
fL; S; 1=Sg  f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg () LW  (L; S; 1=S)  ~LW (~L; ~S; 1= ~S)
Proposition 12 presents the ranking of population-equal histories under RV.
Proposition 12 Assume A1 to A9 and A13. Consider two population-equal
histories fL; S; 1=Sg and f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg, with L > ~L and S < ~S. Under CU, AU,
CLU or NDU, the preferences of an RV planner are:
- If   0, fL; S; 1=Sg  f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg, whatever Q and  are.
- If  < 0, fL; S; 1=Sg  f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg if and only if   

Q(1 S)
L

.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Adopting RV leads to a social ordering that is contrary to the one under
PV. When   0, the social planner prefers population-equal histories where
the renewal of the group is the largest, and where life expectancy is the shortest.
However, when  is very negative, making temporal utility negative, it is better
to avoid a large turnover, as it makes misery spread on a larger set of beings.
Hence, in that case, histories with longer lives are better, as these minimize the
turnover, and, thus, misery (as measured under RV).
Note that, under  < 0, the larger the available space Q is, the more likely
is the preference for a history with a high turnover. The preference parameter
 plays the same role. In sum, the above condition amounts to requiring a non-
negative temporal utility, as otherwise, it is socially optimal to raise longevity
as much as possible, in such a way as to minimize the turnover, and, thus, the
spread of misery on potential beings.
Whether RV recommends a large or a low turnover depends on the asymp-
totic population size L1 S : the higher it is, the more likely is the preference for
a history with a low turnover, and a high life expectancy, which is exactly the
opposite of the recommendation under PV.
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Finally, let us notice that, if the social planner wanted both to adopt a lifecy-
cle view and to weight the calculated individual lifetime welfare by the renewal
measure proposed here, the outcome would coincide with what IV recommends,
that is, an indi¤erence between all population-equal histories. One can thus
interpret IV as an exact compromise between PV and RV.
5.4 A synthesis
To summarize this section, Table 3 shows the impact of Q,  and  on the
social ordering over population-equal histories, under IV, PV and RV. Norma-
tive population criteria such as CU, AU, CLU and NDU do not help any more
here, as the arbitrages between population-equal histories lie outside di¤erent-
numbers comparison. The crucial issue at stake concerns how individual welfare
is counted: either one can take instantaneous utility (i.e. IV), or weight instan-
taneous utility by a lifetime index (i.e. PV), or by a turnover index (i.e. RV).
Table 3: The stationary spaceship problem
Parameters Q  
Criteria Impact on
fL; S; 1=Sg  f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg
IV no no no
PV no if   0 no if   0 no if   0
yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0
RV no if   0 no if   0 no if   0
yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0 yes if  < 0
A rst observation to be made is that IV is the unique approach under
which the social ordering over population-equal histories is independent from
Q,  and . This invariance may be regarded as a strength of that approach,
but it has also its drawbacks: whatever those parameters are, all population-
equal histories are regarded as equivalent under IV. We are thus left with no
precise answer to our question, as all histories are regarded as equally good.
To avoid this anything goesresult, it is tempting to consider the two al-
ternatives: the PV and the RV approaches. Each of these yields an ordering
over population-equal histories that takes a simple form under   0: either
a preference for histories with a high lifetime and a low turnover (under PV),
or a preference for histories with a short lifetime and a high turnover (under
RV). In each case, the social ordering does not depend on Q, or on , so that
those solutions have a high level of generality. Moreover, these solutions are also
independent from the asymptotic population size. However, when  < 0, the
social ordering over population-equal histories under PV and RV may depend
on Q,  and . Furthermore, it is straightfoward to see from Propositions 11
and 12 that, under PV and RV, the social ordering of population-equal histories
depends on the level of the asymptotic population size.
In sum, the focus on a spaceship with a constant asymptotic population
size does not make the selection of a history easier. Either one adheres to the
IV approach, but then one cannot discriminate between any population-equal
histories, or one adheres to the PV or RV approach, which allow a ranking of
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population-equal histories, but such a ranking has also its cost: it requires a
larger informational basis, including estimates of  (and possibly ). Hence
relaxing the xed resources constraint, and, thus, shifting from a nite to a
potentially innite history, does not simplify the problem.
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper was to cast new light on the spaceship problem, by
paying particular attention to the trade-o¤s between adding new persons and
extending the life of existing persons. For that purpose, we assumed that indi-
vidual lifetime welfare is additive over time, and that temporal welfare depends
negatively on population density, and we characterized, under those assump-
tions, the preference orderings of a utilitarian social planner over lifetime-equal
histories, which all exhibit, by construction, an equal number of life-periods.
In the spaceship problem without reproduction, CU selects, contrary to its
populationist reputation, lifetime-equal histories with the smallest number of
persons and the largest longevity. CLU yields exactly the same ordering, inde-
pendently from the critical utility level, which is another counterintuitive result.
AU and NDU take, unlike the two former criteria, more information into ac-
count under a negative intercept of the temporal utility function, and, quite
surprisingly, may exhibit a bias for larger populations in comparison with CU.
Once reproduction is introduced on the spaceship, the social ordering over
lifetime-equal histories is no longer as clear as without reproduction. Here our
normative criteria yield quite di¤erent rankings, as these do not rely on the
same informational basis. CU is the only criterion of our list that ranks histo-
ries independently from the initial population size and the total spaceship size.
Moreover, whereas CU and CLU regard the intercept of the temporal utility
function as irrelevant, the same is not true for AU and NDU.
Then, our focus on the stationary spaceship problem - where all histories
being now characterized by an innite number of life-periods - forced us to shift
our attention from the comparison of lifetime-equal histories to the comparison
of population-equal histories. Given that standard utilitarian criteria do, in that
context, generate the same rankings of population-equal histories, additional
pieces of information must be incorporated into the value function of the planner,
to account for intuitions related to the value of posterity and renewal. We
showed that the instantaneous view (IV) can be regarded as a compromise
between those two opposite intuitions: posterity (PV) and renewal (RV).
In sum, whereas the population ethics literature examined, in general, the
ranking of populations di¤ering in size and in welfare per person (see Blackorby
et al 2005), this paper shows that changing the fundamentals on which popu-
lation ethics relies, by introducing fertility and longevity, and by making wel-
fare dependent on space, does not leave population debates una¤ected. Firstly,
populationist or antipopulationist biases usually associated to criteria such as
CU and AU can be questioned in the light of our study. Secondly, and more
importantly, our analysis highlighted the di¤erentiated inuences of economic
fundamentals (individual preferences, total available space, existing population,
etc.) on the social ranking of histories under distinct utilitarian criteria. Given
that the existing literature relied on other fundamentals, the (in)variance of
population orderings to those fundamentals could hardly be examined before.
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By complementing the existing literature on population ethics, this paper
brings also a contribution to the current debates on the future population of
the Earth. Clearly, the population has always been at the centre of intergener-
ational justice debates, and of the design of a sustainable mode of development
(see Sikora and Barry 1978; Broome 1992). One can indeed hardly talk about
long-run development without evoking demographic trends, and the pressure
the demography can put on the welfare of individuals. Our analysis, in which
demographic variables are explicit, can thus serve as a basis for discussing the
selection of an adequate normative criterion aimed at solving population dilem-
mas. As such, this constitutes the rst, necessary stage before deriving popula-
tion policies aimed at improving social welfare.
Finally, while our re-examination of the spaceship problem casts new light
on that old issue, it should be stressed that further renements of this analysis
could be made, to explore the robustness of our conclusions. Assumptions such
as temporal utility strictly increasing in space per head for any space level, and
the additivity of lifetime welfare, may be questioned. Hence this work is only a
rst stage in the re-examination of the spaceship problem, which invites others.
7 Acknowledgments
The authors are most grateful to Gustaf Arrhenius, Pierre Pestieau and two
anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and comments on this paper.
8 References
Arrhenius, G. & Bykvist, K. (1995). Interpersonal compensation and moral duties to fu-
ture generations: moral aspects of energy use. Uppsala: Uppsala Prints and Preprints in
Philosophy, 21, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
Arrhenius, G. (2008). Life extension versus replacement. Journal of Applied Philosophy,
25 (3), 211-227.
Bentham, J. (1789). Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In M.
Warnock (Ed.), Utilitarianism (1962). London: Fontana Press.
Blackorby, C. & Donaldson, D. (1984). Social criteria for evaluating population change.
Journal of Public Economics, 25, 13-33.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., & Donaldson, D. (2005). Population Issues in Social Choice
Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bommier, A. (2006). Uncertain lifetime and intertemporal choice: risk aversion as a
rationale for time discounting. International Economic Review, 47(4), 1223-1246.
Botero, G. (1588). Della Cause della Grandezza della Citta. Reprinted partly in The
Population and Development Review, 11(2), 1985, 335-340.
Boulding, K. (1966). The Earth as a spaceship. Washington State University Commitee
on Space Sciences, available at
http://www.colorado.edu/econ/Kennneth.Boulding/spaceship-earth.html.
Broome, J. (1992). Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Cambridge: The White Horse
Press.
Broome, J. (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. (2007). Replies. Economics and Philosophy, 23, 115-124.
29
Bykvist, K. (2007). The good, the bad and the ethically neutral. Economics and Philos-
ophy, 23, 97-105.
Cantillon, R. (1755). Essay on the Nature of Trade in General. Paris: INED (new edition:
1952).
Cramer, V., Torgersen, S., & Kringlen, E. (2004). Quality of life in a city: the e¤ect of
population density. Social Indicators Research, 69, 103-116.
Crisp, R. (2007). Neutrality and pleasure. Economics and Philosophy, 23, 81-88.
Gottlieb, M. (1945). The theory of optimum population for a closed economy. Journal of
Political Economy, 53, 289-316.
Heiling, G.K. (1994). How many people can be fed on Earth? In W. Lutz (Ed.), The
Future Population of the World. What can we assume today? London: IIASA, Earthscan.
Hurka, T. (1983). Value and population size. Ethics, 93, April, 496-507.
Kremer, M. (1993). Population growth and technological change: one million BC to 1990.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 681-716.
Malthus, T.R. (1798). Essay on the Principle of Population. London: Pelican Books
(reprint: 1970).
Malthus, T.R. (1830). A Summary View. London: Pelican Books (reprint: 1970).
Mill, J.S. (1859). On Liberty. Edited by M. Warnock (1962). London: Fontana Press.
Ng, Y.-K. (1986). Social criteria for evaluating population change: an alternative to the
Blackorby-Donaldson criterion. Journal of Public Economics, 29, 375-381.
Part, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramsey, F.P. (1928). A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal, 38, 543-549.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1954). A History of Economic Analysis. London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd.
Sidgwick, H. (1874). The Methods of Ethics. London: MacMillan.
Sikora, R.I. & Barry, B. (1978). Obligations to Future Generations. Temple University
Press.
Weitzman, M. (1998). The Noahs Ark Problem. Econometrica, 66(6), 1279-1298.
9 Appendix
9.1 The spaceship problem (1)
Proposition 1 - The Classical Utilitarian solution Social welfare is
larger under fL; S; 0g than under f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if:
L

Q
L

1
1  S1  + L

1  S 
~L

Q
~L

1
1  ~S1  +
~L

1  ~S
Given that L1 S =
~L
1  ~S , the second terms of the LHS and RHS cancel each
other. Moreover, as L1 S =
~L
1  ~S , we have

L
~L
1 
=

1 S
1  ~S
1 
: Thus social
welfare is larger under fL; S; 0g than under f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if
(1  S)1 
1  S1  
(1  ~S)1 
1  ~S1 
The following Lemma will be useful in showing that the above inequality is
never satised for ~S > S.
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Lemma 13 Consider the function F (S) = (1 S)
a
1 Sb with 0 < b < 1 and a  b.
We have F 0(S)  0 for all 0 < S < 1.
Proof. Applying the quotient rule of di¤erentiation, it follows that:
F 0(S) =
a(1  S)a 1( 1)(1  Sb)  (1  S)a   bSb 1
(1  Sb)2
=
(1  S)a 1 a
(1  Sb)2

b
a
Sb 1(1  S)  (1  Sb)

Note that Sb 1 > 0, (1  S) > 0, and (1  Sb) > 0:
First consider a < 0, in which case we have not only (1 S)
a 1a
(1 Sb)2 < 0 but also
b
aS
b 1(1  S)  (1  Sb) < 0 as well, implying F 0(S) > 0.
If a = 0, we have (1 S)
a 1a
(1 Sb)2 = 0, immediately implying F
0(S) = 0.
Finally, consider a > 0. In this case, (1 S)
a 1a
(1 Sb)2 > 0, so that the sign of
F 0(S) is the same as the sign of

b
aS
b 1(1  S)  (1  Sb). Since Sb 1(1  
S) > 0, this expression is clearly decreasing in a. Thus, if it can be shown
that

b
aS
b 1(1  S)  (1  Sb) is positive at the largest acceptable value of
a (i.e. a = b), then it would follow that

b
aS
b 1(1  S)  (1  Sb) is pos-
itive for all acceptable values of a. With a = b, this expression becomes
Sb 1(1  S)  (1  Sb) = Sb 1 Sb 1+Sb = Sb 1 1. Since 0 < S < 1 and
0 < b < 1 (so that b  1 < 0), it follows that Sb 1 > 1. Therefore Sb 1   1 > 0,
implying F 0(S) > 0 for all 0 < a  b.
That Lemma can be used to characterize the social planners preferences
over two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g. Indeed, we know that
fL; S; 0g is better than f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if:
(1  S)1 
1  S1  
(1  ~S)1 
1  ~S1 
From the Lemma, it follows that (1 S)
1 
1 S1  is increasing in S (since
(1 S)1 
1 S1  is
the specication of F (S) with a = b = 1  ). Therefore fL; S; 0g  f~L; ~S; 0g.
Regarding Corollary 1, note that, under  = 0, the inequality (1 S)
1 
1 S1  
(1  ~S)1 
1  ~S1  is always a strict equality, so that indi¤erence prevails between all
lifetime-equal histories.
Regarding Corollary 2, note that, under  = 1, social welfare is
L

Q
L
+ 

+ SL

Q
SL
+ 

+ S2L

Q
S2L
+ 

+ :::
= Q+Q+ :::+Q+
L
1  S
That expression is the same for all lifetime-equal histories.
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Proposition 2 - The Average Utilitarian solution Under AU, social
welfare under a history fL; S; 0g is
W =
L

Q
L

+ L+ SL

Q
SL

+ SL+ S2L

Q
S2L

+ S2L+ :::
L
W =

Q
L

1
1  S1  +

1  S
Take the case where   0. It is straightforward to see that
@W
@S
=

Q
L

1  
(1  S1 )2 S +

(1  S)2 > 0
@W
@L
= Q( )L  1 1
1  S1  < 0
Thus, any increase in S is preferred by an AU planner, and any decrease
in L is preferred by an AU planner. Therefore, such a planner would prefer
f~L; ~S; 0g to fL; S; 0g with L > ~L and S < ~S even without any restriction on
the relation between L and S. Hence an AU planner prefers histories with a
higher survival rate and a smaller initial population in a sense much stronger
than a CU planner, since for an AU planner such a preference arises even if
the two di¤erent proles of demographic parameters do not yield lifetime-equal
histories.
In the case where  < 0, the same general conclusions cannot be drawn.
Actually, under  < 0, it is still true that @W@L < 0, but not necessarily true that
@W
@S > 0. Hence one cannot conclude that an AU planner necessarily prefers a
history with a higher survival rate, unlike under   0.
If one focuses on lifetime-equal histories fL; S; 0g and f~L; ~S; 0g with L > ~L
and S < ~S , it is possible to derive a general condition on  such that fL; S; 0g
is preferred to f~L; ~S; 0g.
Indeed, social welfare is larger under fL; S; 0g than under f~L; ~S; 0g if and
only if: 
Q
L

1
1  S1  +

1  S 

Q
~L

1
1  ~S1  +

1  ~S
Given that L1 S =
~L
1  ~S , we have:
QL 
(1  S) 
"
(1  S) 
1  S1   
(1  ~S) 
1  ~S1 
#
 

1
1  ~S  
1
1  S

By the Lemma, the factor in brackets is always strictly negative, so that the
LHS is negative.37 We know that the second factor of the RHS is positive, and
so, given  < 0, the sign of the RHS is also negative. Thus the above inequality
is true if and only if  is su¢ ciently negative, that is, if and only if
  Q
L (1  ~S)(1  S)
( ~S   S)(1  S) 
"
(1  S) 
1  S1   
(1  ~S) 
1  ~S1 
#
as stated in Proposition 2.
37Note that, under   0, that inequality is thus never satised, as the LHS is strictly
negative, and the RHS is strictly positive. Hence, in conformity with the above ndings,
fL; S; 0g  f~L; ~S; 0g.
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Proposition 3 - The Critical-Level Utilitarian solution Social wel-
fare is larger under fL; S; 0g than under f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if:
L

Q
L

1
1  S1  + L

1  S   Lu^ 
~L

Q
~L

1
1  ~S1  +
~L

1  ~S  
~Lu^
Given that ~L
1  ~S =
L
1 S , that condition becomes:
(1  S)1 
1  S1  
(1  ~S)1 
1  ~S1  +
u^(L  ~L)(1  ~S)1 
~L1 Q
Given the Lemma, the rst term of the RHS exceeds the LHS under ~S > S.
Hence, given that the second term of the RHS is strictly positive, the above
inequality is never satised, and f~L; ~S; 0g is always preferred to fL; S; 0g.
Proposition 4 - The Number-Dampened Utilitarian solution So-
cial welfare is larger under fL; S; 0g than under f~L; ~S; 0g if and only if:
(Q)

"
L 
1  S1   
~L 
1  ~S1 
#
 
"
~L
1  ~S  
L
1  S
#
Given that ~L
1  ~S =
L
1 S , that condition becomes:
(Q)

L 
(1  S) 
"
(1  S) 
1  S1   
(1  ~S) 
1  ~S1 
#
 L

(1  S)
"
(1  ~S)
1  ~S  
(1  S)
1  S
#
By the Lemma, we know that (1 S)
 
1 S1  is increasing in S (since
(1 S) 
1 S1  is
the specication of F (S) with a =   and b = 1 ). Hence, given ~S > S, the
LHS is necessarily negative. Regarding the RHS, we know also, still by using our
Lemma, that (1 S)

1 S is increasing in S (since
(1 S)
1 S is the specication of F (S)
with a =  and b = 1), so that the factor in brackets in the RHS is positive.
Hence, two cases should be distinguished, depending on .
If   0, the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive, so that the above
inequality is never satised. Thus, under   0, we have that f~L; ~S; 0g is always
preferred to fL; S; 0g.
If  < 0, the LHS is negative and the RHS is also negative, so that the
above condition may be satised. Actually, isolating  from the above inequality
yields:
  Q
L (1  ~S)(1  S)
(1  S) 
h
(1  ~S)(1  S)1    (1  ~S)
i " (1  S) 
1  S1   
(1  ~S) 
1  ~S1 
#
which is the condition appearing in Proposition 4.
Note that, if  = 0, that condition is the same as under AU, whereas, under
 = 1, that condition is never satised, as the denominator of the rst factor
of the RHS equals 0, so that the RHS equals  1. Thus  cannot be smaller
than the RHS, and so the condition is never satised, and f~L; ~S; 0g is always
preferred to fL; S; 0g as under CU.
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9.2 The spaceship problem (2)
Proposition 5 - The Classical Utilitarian solution When counting
the welfare of each cohort separately, social welfare is
L

Q
L

+ S

Q
SL+ nSL

+ S2

Q
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L

+ :::

+ L (1 + S + :::)
+SLn

Q
SL+ nSL

+ S

Q
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L

+ :::

+ SLn (1 + S + :::)
+S2Ln2

Q
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L

+ :::

+ S2Ln2 (1 + S + :::) + :::
If one sorts out the two components of temporal welfare, one has:
L

Q
L

+ S

Q
L

(S + Sn)  + S2

Q
L

(S2 + nS2 + n2S2)  + :::

+SLn

Q
L

(S + Sn)  + S

Q
L

(S2 + nS2 + n2S2)  + :::

+:::+
L
1  S +
SLn
1  S +
S2Ln2
1  S + :::
Therefore, social welfare is
L

Q
L
 h
1 + S1 (1 + n)  + S2(1 )(1 + n+ n2)  + :::
i
+Ln

Q
L
 h
S1 (1 + n)  + S2(1 )(1 + n+ n2)  + S3(1 )
 
1 + n+ n2 + n3
 
+ :::
i
+Ln2

Q
L
 h
S2(1 )(1 + n+ n2)  + :::
i
+ :::+
L
(1  S)(1  Sn)
Hence, noting that
Pt
s=0 n
s = 1 n
t+1
1 n , we have
L

Q
L

+ L

Q
L

S1 

1  n2
1  n
1 
+ :::+
L
(1  S)(1  Sn)
Note that, by denition of lifetime-equal histories, we have: L(1 S)(1 Sn) =
L
(1  ~S)(1  ~S~n) for any two lifetime-equal histories fL; S; ng and fL; ~S; ~ng. Hence
the last term does not a¤ect the social ranking of those histories.
Therefore social welfare is larger under fL; S; ng than under fL; ~S; ~ng if and
only if:
1X
t=0

St   Stnt+1
1  n
1 

1X
t=0
 
~St   ~St~nt+1
1  ~n
!1 
The corollary follows from xing  = 0 in the above condition. This yields:
1X
t=0
St
1  nt+1
1  n 
1X
t=0
~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
which is a strict equality, as the LHS and the RHS are equal to the total number
of life-periods per initial resident of the spaceship, in, respectively, fL; S; ng and
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fL; ~S; ~ng, which is, by denition, the same in all lifetime-equal histories. Thus
it follows that fL; S; ng  fL; ~S; ~ng:
Moreover, social welfare is, under  = 1 :
LQ
L
+
(SL+ nSL)Q
SL+ nSL
+
 
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L

Q
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L
+ :::+
L
(1  S)(1  Sn)
= Q+Q+ :::+Q+
L
(1  S)(1  Sn)
Hence social welfare is here the same in all lifetime-equal histories.
Proposition 6 - The Average Utilitarian solution Under AU, social
welfare is
L

Q
L

+ (SL+ nSL)

Q
SL+nSL

+ :::
L+ LSn+ LS2n2 + :::
+
L
(1 S)(1 nS)
L+ LSn+ LS2n2 + :::
= (1  Sn)

Q
L
 24 1X
t=0
 
St
tX
s=0
ns
!1 35+ 
1  S
Given
Pt
s=0 n
s = 1 n
t+1
1 n , social welfare under fL; S; ng is larger than under
fL; ~S; ~ng if and only if:
1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
 1  S
1  ~S
1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 
 Q
 L
1  Sn

1
1  ~S  
1
1  S

Isolating , that condition becomes:
  Q
L (1  Sn)(1  ~S)(1  S)
~S   S
" 1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
  1  S
1  ~S
1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 #
Proposition 7 - The Critical-Level Utilitarian solution Social wel-
fare is here equal to
L

Q
L

+ (SL+ nSL)

Q
SL+ nSL

+
 
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L
 Q
S2L+ nS2L+ n2S2L

+ :::
+
L
(1  S)(1  Sn) 
 
L+ SLn+ S2Ln2 + :::

u^
= L

Q
L
 h
1 + (S(1 + n))
1 
+
 
S2(1 + n+ n2)
1 
+ :::
i
+ L

(1  S)(1  Sn)   L
1
1  nS u^
Hence, social welfare is larger under fL; S; ng than under fL; ~S; ~ng if and
only if:
1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
 
1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 


Q
L
 
u^

1
1  nS  
1
1  ~n ~S

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Proposition 8 - The Number-Dampened Utilitarian solution So-
cial welfare is here equal to

L+ SLn+ S2Ln2 + :::
 24(1  Sn)Q
L
 24 1X
t=0
 
St
tX
s=0
ns
!1 35+ 
1  S
35
= L  (1  Sn)1  (Q)
24 1X
t=0
 
St
tX
s=0
ns
!1 35+  L
1  Sn


1  S
Hence, social welfare is larger under fL; S; ng than under fL; ~S; ~ng if and
only if:
1X
t=0

St
1  nt+1
1  n
1 
 

1  S
1  ~S
1  " 1X
t=0

~St
1  ~nt+1
1  ~n
1 #
  (Q)
 
L
(1  Sn)1 

1
1  ~S~n

1
1  ~S  

1
1  Sn

1
1  S

9.3 The spaceship problem (3)
Proposition 9 - The equivalence result If n = 0, the total number of
life-periods is:
L+ SL+ S2L+ ::: =
L
1  S
Knowing that the born at time t are equal to the born at time t 1multiplied
by Sn, the long-run population is (from the youngest to the oldest)
L1 = (LS1n1)Sn+(LS1 1n1 1)Sn+:::+(LS2n2)S1 2+(LSn)S1 1+LS1
Under Sn = 1, this vanishes to
L+ LS + LS2 + LS3 + ::::+ LS1 =
L
1  S
Proposition 10 - The Instantaneous View Two population-equal his-
tories have, by denition, the same stationary asymptotic population, equal to
L
1 S . Thus these have the same space per head (q =
Q(1 S)
L ), and the same
utility per life-period. Therefore, those histories have the same social welfare.
For instance, social welfare at the steady-state is, under CU, equal in the two
histories, as:
L
1  S

Q(1  S)
L

+ 

=
~L
1  ~S
" 
Q(1  ~S)
~L
!
+ 
#
as long as L1 S =
~L
1  ~S . This result holds also under other utilitarian criteria, as
these yield the same rankings as CU as long as the population size is the same,
independently from whether that population is made of young or old persons.
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Proposition 11 - The Posterity View The average lifetime welfare at
the steady-state is the product of life expectancy and utility per life-period:
1
1 S
h
Q(1 S)
L

+ 
i
. Thus steady-state social welfare is, under CU, larger in
f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg than in fL; S; 1=Sg if and only if:
~L
1  ~S
1
1  ~S
" 
Q(1  ~S)
~L
!
+ 
#
 L
1  S
1
1  S

Q(1  S)
L

+ 

Given that L1 S =
~L
1  ~S and
1
1  ~S >
1
1 S , that condition is

Q(1 S)
L

  .
That condition is a strict equality when   0, so that we have f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg better
than fL; S; 1=Sg. But if  < 0, that is no longer true. We have fL; S; 1=Sg
better than f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg if and only if

Q(1 S)
L

<  . A similar rationale can
be used for AU, CLU and NDU.
Proposition 12 - The Renewal View The temporal welfare of a person
living at the steady-state, if weighted by the renewal index L, is L
h
Q(1 S)
L

+ 
i
.
Hence social welfare at the steady-state is, under CU, larger in fL; S; 1=Sg than
in f~L; ~S; 1= ~Sg if and only if:
L
1  SL

Q(1  S)
L

+ 


~L
1  ~S
~L
" 
Q(1  ~S)
~L
!
+ 
#
Given that L1 S =
~L
1  ~S and L >
~L, a strict inequality always holds under
  0. A similar rationale can be used for AU, CLU and NDU. Under  < 0,
the ranking depends on the condition stated in Proposition 12.
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